

LUCAN'S CAESAR AND STOIC ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣΙΣ THEORY: THE STOIC FOOL

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Scholars have given much attention, with little agreement, to the role of Stoicism in Lucan's characterization of the three major *personae* in his poem: Caesar, Cato, and Pompey.¹ Most of this discussion has focused on whether Pompey is or is not a *proficiens*. All, of course, treat the poet's Cato as a Stoic wise man; this is, after all, the historical Cato's *imago* in imperial literature. Few, however, have examined the role of Stoicism in Lucan's portrayal of Caesar. While almost all would agree that Caesar is the *Bellum Civile*'s chief villain, not all would see him as an essentially Stoic villain.² This paper will show that the poet uses the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις to cast Caesar as a Stoic fool. Before discussing the text, therefore, a brief review of this doctrine would be useful.

Οἰκείωσις is the natural orientation of a soul, resulting from the composition nature has given it. The Stoics used the doctrine of οἰκείωσις in two ways; first it supplied a psychological explanation for what they understood to be the development from physiological self interest and the primal urge to

¹ Hereafter the *Bellum Civile* will be cited simply by book and line number, following Housman's text except where noted. For Stoicism in the poem generally, see e.g. H.-A. Schotes, *Stoische Physik, Psychologie und Theologie bei Lucan* (Bonn 1969), who extracts statements from the poem which can be shown to be Stoic, but does not go far enough in considering their relationship to the poetry. There is, however, no agreement on the degree to which the Stoa influences the poem. Schotes, 113, for example, finds an un-Stoic pessimism in Lucan's cosmology; cf. also F. d'Espèry, "Le destin dans les épopées de Lucain et de Stace," in *Visages du destin dans les mythologies: Mélanges J. Duchemin* (Paris 1983) 95–104; while E. Sikes, *Roman Poetry* (New York 1923) 194ff., sees the poem as uniquely Stoic, and M. Lapidge, "Lucan's Imagery of Cosmic Dissolution," *Hermes* 107 (1979) 344–70 argues that a Stoic metaphor (the civil war as the conflagration) unites the first seven books.

² For recent bibliography on Lucan's characterizations see W. Rutz, "Lucan 1964–83," *Lustrum* 26 (1984), for Caesar, 160–64; for Pompey, 164–69; for Cato, 169–74; for the importance of Stoic ethics in general, 196–98. The argument still rages over B. Marti's thesis in "The meaning of the Pharsalia," *AJP* 66 (1945) 352–76 that Pompey is a Stoic *proficiens*. For Cato in Roman literature, see P. Pecchiura, *La Figura di Catone Uticense nella letteratura latina* (Torino 1965) *passim*. With regard to Caesar, there are those (e.g. M. Haffter, "Dem schwanken Zünglein lauschend wachte Cäsar dort," *MH* 14 [1957] 118–26) who would see Caesar as an unintended hero; but cf. *inter alios* F. Ahl, *Lucan, An Introduction* (Cornell 1976) 190–230.

survive toward the desire to seek moral virtue; second, it provided the foundation for their theories of justice and ethics. Thus the doctrine had an "inward" and "outward" looking aspect.³

In brief, the Stoics held the inward aspect of οἰκείωσις to work thus: the first impulse of all living beings is toward self-preservation, and from this impulse all actions ultimately derive.⁴ As a living creature develops, that which is fitting and natural for it changes. So long as the being is not rational (i.e. lacking a λόγος, e.g., animals or young children), all that it does according to impulse is natural, and the being is in harmony with nature. However, with the introduction of Reason into a man at about age seven, there is a possibility of error. A man can make a false judgment about what is in his interest and thus generate impulses which are not in accord with nature. These impulses the Stoics call the emotions—πάθη or, in Latin, *perturbationes animi*.⁵ The wise man will always make right judgments about what is in his interest. The fool

³ The primary texts are SVF 3.178; Hierocles 1.38; Seneca, *Ep.* 121.1 for its psychological aspects; Cicero, *Fin.* 3 for its extension to one's place in the state. For general discussions see B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford 1985); M. Forshner, *Die Stoische Ethik* (Stuttgart 1981) 142–59; J. Rist, "Zeno and Stoic consistency," *Phronesis* 22 (1977) 161–74; F. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London 1975) 31–36, S. Pembroke, "Oikeiōsis" in A. Long, ed., *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 115–49. For more specific discussions see B. Inwood, "Hierocles: Theory and argument in the second century A. D.," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984) 151–83, on Hierocles' treatment of Stoic ethics and orthodoxy of oikeiosis doctrine; G. Striker, "The role of oikeiosis in Stoic ethics" *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983) 145–67 on the uses which the Stoa made of the doctrine to answer the logical problem of their claim that moral virtue was the only good; H. Goergemanns, "Oikeiosis in Arius Didymus" and B. Inwood's response, "The two forms of Oikeiosis in Arius and the Stoa" in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus* (New Brunswick 1983) chapter 9 on the Stoic originality of the doctrine; cf. C. Brink, "Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory," *Phronesis* 1 (1956) 123–45. M. G. Kerferd, "The search for Personal identity in Stoic thought," *Bulletin of The John Rylands University Library* 55 (1972) 177–96 for the inward aspect.

⁴ In *Fin.* 3.5–6, Cicero has his Cato outline the position. The doctrine underwent some change of emphasis in the later Stoa. The first Stoics were very interested in the physics while Roman Stoics as a whole, ignoring the physics, were more concerned with its application to ethics generally and specifically to its implications about one's relationship to society at large, cf. H. Hunt, "The importance of Zeno's physics for an understanding of Stoicism during the Roman Republic," *Apeiron* 1 (1967) 5–14.

⁵ This whole process is related to sense perception—that is, to the recognition of the distinction between kataleptic and non-kataleptic presentations; cf. F. Sandbach, "Phantasia kataleptike," in Long, *Problems*, (above, note 3) 9–21. For emotions as mistaken judgments, see SVF 3.456, 463; Seneca, *De Ira* 1.1.3–7; 1.8.1–7. See also J. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Albany 1970) 181–96; A. Lloyd, "Emotion and Decision in Stoic Psychology," in J. Rist, ed., *The Stoics* (Berkeley 1978) 233–46; I. Kidd, "Poseidonius on Emotion" in Long, (above, note 3) 200–215.

will sometimes make right judgments, at other times not. The distinction, however, is not between the rightness or wrongness of a particular choice / action, but about how the choice is made. The wise man's soul has its natural orientation; that is, it is inclined toward the Rational and Natural, and its impulses are natural and rational. The fool, however, is a mass of irrational and unnatural impulses. Thus, even though he may make a proper choice or perform an appropriate act, he is nonetheless morally wrong—the reasons for his choice are not in accord with Reason. It is the disposition of the soul which matters, not the deed.

In its second aspects, οικείωσις serves to engender social relationships and duties.⁶ The Stoics held that the basis for all human society is the love which parents show their children: "pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur (sc. Stoici) intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur, a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur" (Cicero, *Fin.* 3.19.62). From this love spring in concentric circles the bonds which cement humans into their natural union with each other and which are necessary for their survival (e.g., family, state, all men, the cosmos):

ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit non alienum videri...multo haec coniunctus (sc. animalibus) homines. itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates. (3.19.63)

Moreover, it is the wise man's duty to attempt to contract the circles (e.g., to treat an uncle like a father) until he treats all men as brothers. Thus patriotism and sacrifice of the individual for the good of the state are in accord with Nature and Reason. "*ex quo fit ut laudandus is sit qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos*" (3.19.64). In addition, it is man's natural orientation to help his fellow man. "*impellimur autem natura ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis*" (3.20.65). This is what separates men and gods from beasts; men and gods are impelled by nature to treat each other with respect and justice. Cicero's account of the Stoic position is worth quoting at length (*Fin.* 3.20.67):

sed quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria; quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret eum iustum, qui migraret iniustum fore....cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea

⁶ Cicero, *Fin.* 3.19–22, is the major ancient treatment of the Stoa's position. Hierocles 1.38 discusses the concentric circles.

liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur.

The Stoic wise man, then, recognizes his duty to family and society. From procreation (since this is the beginning of society) to entrance into politics, if he conducts his life rationally, he will benefit the state. In Stoic terms, any civil war is contrary to this doctrine. Civil war is, as Cato notes in book two, by definition *nefas* (2.285), violating the laws of both Nature and men. Thus, a wise man will join in it, if at all, only to rectify an injustice which has perverted man's natural orientation.⁷

With this in mind we should now look at Lucan's use of the doctrine in his characterization of Caesar. As Caesar crosses the Rubicon at 1.183ff., a vision of Roma stops him.⁸ She addresses him mournfully and demands of him and his men:

...quo tenditis ultra?
quid fertis mea signa, viri? si iure venitis,
si cives, huc usque licet. (1.190–92)

Here Roma challenges the great general and his troops—whose citizens are they; for whom do they fight? The indignant *mea signa* reminds everyone that it should be Rome's army before which Caesar stands. *Si cives*, moreover, is pointed—what Caesar is about to do is not the act of a Roman citizen but of a foreign enemy. Her words halt even the determined Caesar. Religious awe (*horror*) overcomes him (1.192–94). At first he cannot admit that he is at war with Rome (*non te furialibus armis / persequor* 200–201), indeed he pleads for her to look upon him as he had once been: Rome's victorious general (1.201–2). But even he, though he wishes that it were still true, sees that time has passed; *ubique tuus (liceat modo, nunc quoque) miles*. Thus Caesar declares that he will make Pompey a criminal for having made him Rome's enemy; *ille erit*

⁷ See M. Reesor, *The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa* (New York 1951) 16–19, for the old Stoa; 36–37 for Blossius; Panaetius 27–35; Posidonius 38–58. For Roman attitudes in general toward civil war, see, P. Jal, *La Guerre Civile à Rome. Etude littéraire et morale* (Paris 1963).

⁸ Scholars have given much attention to the lines. They have been well and diversely explicated, e.g., R. Getty, "Lucan and Caesar's crossing the Rubicon," *The James Sprunt Studies* 46 (1964) 73–81, has an interesting suggestion that Roma is not the personified *patria* but the deified empire; cf. W. Goerler, "Cäsars Rubikon-Übergang in der Darstellung Lucans" in *Studien zum antiken Epos*, 291–308; E. Narducci, "Cesare e la patria (Ipotesi su *Phars.* 1.135–92)," *Maia* 32 (1980) 175–78, who sees in the crossing a reference to Drusus (Dio 55.1.3), *isdem*, "Allusività e autodemistificazione. Lucano 7.254–63," *Maia* 28 (1976) 127–28 for how Lucan ties the episode to the battle at Pharsalus; H. Glaesener, "Un mot historique de Cesar," *AC* 22 (1953) 103–5, who argues that Lucan gives one of the best (i.e., truest) accounts of the episode in antiquity. For Caesar generally in the *Pharsalia* see M. Schioppa, *Caesare nella Pharsalia di Lucano* (Portici della Torre 1942).

ille nocens, qui me tibi fecerit hostem (1.203).⁹ With this admission that he is Rome's *hostis*, Caesar's posture changes. No longer can Caesar claim to be fighting for Rome, no longer can he think that he is fighting for justice; he knows that he fights for himself. Caesar has severed himself from Roma. With this realization, he unleashes war upon his former mistress (*inde moras soluit belli* 1.204).

After he has crossed the Rubicon, the general is even more bold in his declaration. He has set aside his obligations as a citizen and will trust only in Fortuna:

"hic" ait "hic pacem temerataque iura relinquo;
te, Fortuna, sequor. (1.225–26)

Indeed he is done with piety; whereas formerly he had waited on fate, now he will entrust himself to the arbitration of war:

...procul hinc iam foedera sunt;
credidimus fatis, utendum est iudice bello. (1.226–27)¹⁰

This then is Caesar's answer to Roma, but his troops have not yet responded—for they too were challenged (*virī*). Caesar has severed himself from Rome and is fighting a civil war, but his troops have not yet gone so far.

Lucan quickly turns his attention to Caesar's men, but he first removes all doubt as to what Caesar now fights for—himself. Indeed the great general, having decided upon war, is now merely looking for a reason which would alleviate his shame for turning on Rome (*pudoris / rumpunt fata moras* 1.263–64). The poet later likens him to an Elean race horse waiting for the starting signal (1.292–95). This Fortuna supplies him in the person of Curio. Indeed a constitutional *causa belli* is provided by the tribune's speech (1.265–67; 274–79), but more importantly for our discussion it expressly states what the shrewd

⁹ In the immediate context, the *ille* refers to Pompey, but the poet may also mean for it to refer to Cato (cf. Brutus' *accipient alios, facient te bella nocentem* at 2.259, and Cato's *crimen erit superis et me fecisse nocentem* at 2.288).

¹⁰ Houseman's emendation, *credidimus satis his, utendum est iudice bello*, is surely wrong. Aside from there being no evidence in the mss. for suspecting a problem (all read *credidimus fatis*), removing *fatis* would destroy the chiasmus with *Fortuna. Te, Fortuna, sequor* is answered by *utendum est iudice bello* and *procul hinc iam foedera sunt* is answered by *credidimus fatis*. The poet contrasts Fortuna, civil war, and now, with then, civil law and Fate. Moreover, the contrast is supported later in the poem. For while Caesar follows Fortuna, Cato follows Fate (*sed quo fata trahunt virtus secunda sequetur* 2.286). Indeed Lucan's Stoic wise man rejects Fortuna as the fool's god, setting her against virtue, the *summum bonum* (9.569–70). The poet is here laying the ground work for later judging Caesar against Cato (see below). There is, of course, precedent for Lucan's treatment of Cato and Caesar as *exempla* of different types of *virtus*; cf. Sallust's *synkrisis* (*B.C.* 53–54). The present discussion of the Stoa's influence on Lucan's treatment of his characters is not meant to exclude or supersede the Roman cultural and literary forces at work on the poet. Cf. E. Fraenkel's review in *Gnomon* 2 (1926) 510.

Curio perceives to be Caesar's true aim—to possess as Caesar's that which is Rome's.

...facili si proelia pauca
gesseris eventum, tibi Roma subegerit orbem. (1.284–85)

Curio's closing remarks make the point even more boldly: *partiri non potes orbem, / solus habere potes* (1.290–91).¹¹ His shame overthrown, his doubts set aside, Caesar now seeks to sever his troops from Rome. Thus far there is nothing particularly Stoic in this. Many of the poet's words may indeed have some general relationship with Stoic teachings about οἰκείωσις, but civil war is *nefas* for any Roman—Stoic, Epicurean, or Academic.¹² With Laelius' response (1.359–86), however, Lucan begins to examine closely Caesar and his men in explicitly Stoic terms and so to lay down the foundation by which the reader is to judge Caesar.

After Caesar's speech (1.299–351) the men at first are full of doubts (*dubium, incerta* 1.352–53). They, as Caesar did, feel shame, while piety puts a check upon their behavior:

...pietas patrique penates
quamquam caede feras mentes animosque tumentes
frangunt... (1.353–55)

They waver between their own natural impulse toward the state and family (οἰκείωσις) and the mad impulses which had been driving them. But in the end, Caesar's speech works; they are driven by πάθη (here *amor* and *metus*)¹³ to submit to their general's will. Their natural orientation is overwhelmed.

...sed diro ferri revocantur amore
ductorisque metu. (1.355–56)

The words *dirus amor* are pointedly ironic. For, as will be shown, it is this *dirus amor* which has replaced the *sacer amor* (cf. 4.189–92) which arises from their natural orientation. Lucan demonstrates the full effect and horror of this displacement through Laelius' speech (1.359–86). The centurion speaks both for himself and the entire army.

¹¹ The psychological assumptions which underlie his speech are Stoic in that it aims to stir Caesar's *ira* as an expression of his desire. The Stoa held that *ira* and irrational *amor* were sub-classes of ἐπιθυμία, SVF 3.395. Also SVF 3.398 ties *ira* closely to ambition. Seneca, *De Ira* 1.3.2, quotes Aristotle's definition (*De Anima* 403a.30): "Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostris abest; ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi." Also at 1.21.1ff. Seneca cites *ira* with other types of ἐπιθυμία (*luxuria, avaritia, libido, ambitio*).

¹² Lucan may have meant his simile at 1.205–12 to be read in the light of Stoic psychology (cf. Seneca *De Ira* 3.2.6). Caesar is beginning to function irrationally because of his *ira*. Indeed, as will be shown below, it is with his *ira* that Caesar corrupts the troops.

¹³ When *amor* is directed toward an irrational object it is a sub-class of ἐπιθυμία, when toward a rational object it is an εὐπάθεια (see above, note 11).

Laelius declares that he and his fellows are Caesar's. The poet does not miss the chance which Laelius' speech affords him to use the metaphor with which the Stoics described their psychological model—the general and his army. For Laelius, he and his men are an extension of Caesar's will; Caesar is their ἡγεμονικόν. Their hands, their arms, their bodies, their blood are Caesar's (1.362–63). For them there is no duty to the gods, no allegiance to country, no honor for family—only Caesar (1.373–74). Laelius' title for his general, *maxime rector*, is indeed appropriate (1.359). For, as Jupiter is *Rector Olympi* (cf. 2.4; 5.620) and ἡγεμονικόν of the world soul, so Caesar is *maxime rector*, ἡγεμονικόν, for his troops.¹⁴ His concluding remarks are equally pointed:

tu quoscumque voles in planum effundere muros,
his aries actus disperget saxa lacertis,
illa licet, penitus tolli quam iusseris urbem,
Roma sit. (1.383–86)

He thinks of himself as the body to Caesar's will. Indeed his language throughout is corporal (e.g. *dum movet haec calidus spirantia corpora sanguis* 1.363; also 1.369, 376–78). Moreover, again and again he says it is Caesar's place to will and command (*duc* 1.367, *tua classica* 1.373, *iubeas* 1.377, *voles* 1.383), while it is his and the troops' function to listen and bring this will into action (*iussa sequi* 1.372, *audiero* 1.373). They are the physical expression of Caesar's *ira*, but their ἡγεμονικόν is not in accord with Reason.¹⁵

More importantly, Caesar's speech has undone the bonds which unite Laelius and his fellows to the rest of humanity. Caesar has distorted their natural orientation toward family and state (οἰκείωσις). This is the point of Laelius' exclamation, *nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar, audiero* (1.373–74). Laelius, like Curio (cf. 1.277–79), is no longer a *civis Romanus*—indeed he is no longer a *civis* (the natural state of a man), he simply belongs to Caesar. The poet has underscored the true horror of what Laelius is saying when introducing him:

Laelius emeritique gerens insignia doni
servati civis referentem praemia quercum. (1.357–58)

¹⁴ See Cornutus 2.13–14 for Jupiter as ἡγεμονικόν of the world soul. J. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 256–72, provides a useful discussion of the Stoic view of the soul.

¹⁵ Though a generation later, Epictetus provides a similar image of the tyrant (1.29.9–12). Here the tyrant controls through fear. Moreover, it is the judgments of others which he wishes to control, seeking to become their ἡγεμονικόν; this is identical to Caesar's *modus operandi*. For a discussion of Epictetus' view of tyranny see C. Starr, Jr., "Epictetus and the Tyrant," *CPh* 44 (1949) 20–29. On Lucan's use of fear (raw numbers compared with other epic poets) see: L. A. Mackay, "The Vocabulary of Fear in Latin Epic Poetry," *TAPA* 92 (1961) 308–16. Cf. the episode at Placentia (5.237–73). E. Fantham, "Caesar and the Mutiny: Lucan's Reshaping of the Historical Tradition in *De Bello Civili* 5.237–373," *CQ* 80 (1985) 119–31, at 124, comes to a similar conclusion about Caesar's troops becoming "a mere weapon or instrument" from rhetorical considerations.

Caesar has transformed this centurion from a man whose greatest mark of distinction was that he had saved a fellow citizen's life into one who would willingly slaughter his fellow citizens for Caesar. Lucan emphasizes the depth of Caesar's control when he has Laelius declare:

pectore si fratris gladium iuguloque parentis
condere me iubeas plenaeque in viscera partu
coniugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra... (1.376–78)

Though his own body knows the deed to be unnatural, he will willingly violate nature to perform Caesar's will. Laelius rejects family and even parental love (his father's toward him and his own toward his unborn child)—for Stoics, the very basis of society. Caesar, the Stoic fool, strikes not only at the state but perverts the very impulses which bind it together.

In the Petreius episode of book four (4.157–401), Lucan demonstrates even more clearly the importance of this perversion of οἰκείωσις.¹⁶ At the beginning of the episode, Caesar dispatches his men to cut off the Pompeians' retreat (4.157–62). When, however, his troops see the enemy face to face, they realize the horror of what they are about to do (4.169–72). For a time they are held by their usual fear of Caesar (4.172–74; cf. 3.430ff.), but natural affection (here *ardens amor* = οἰκείωσις) is stronger than Caesar's controlling force, and his control dissolves.

...mox, ut stimulis maioribus ardens
rupit amor leges... (4.174–75)

Lucan carefully emphasizes those familial ties which Caesarism destroys: the *hospitis...nomen, propinquum*, and *consors puerilibus* of 4.176–77.¹⁷ In language which is very similar to Laelius' speech (4.182–88, cf. 4.186ff. with 1.373ff. —*classica, signa*) the poet reminds the reader that it is Caesar's men who give Caesar the power to bring his will into action. They are his body. If they submit to their own natural impulses, civil war will end.

Lucan then invokes *Concordia*, whom he addresses as *o rerum mixtique salus...mundi / et sacer orbis amor* (4.190–91). The troops' *amor* is a reflection of this natural principle of harmony which holds the universe together and against which civil war is an outrage. As such, it is a reflection of the Stoic divine principle; *Concordia* is the personification of οἰκείωσις.¹⁸ The image is uniquely Stoic. Lucan, moreover, turns it into a very Lucanian paradox. Caesar's troops have broken the *lex* established by Caesar's πάθος in

¹⁶ A passage (11.16ff.) in Hierocles demonstrates the Stoic nature and importance of Lucan's Petreius episode. There the second century A. D. Stoic cites, *inter alia*, enemy troops' showing care for each other after battle as the most outstanding evidence for the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις as reflected in man's need to bond into states.

¹⁷ If 4.171 belongs in the text, one should also note the *fratres, natos*, and *patres*.

¹⁸ *Concordia* is a translation of ὁμόνοια, with which Chrysippus describes Zeus, the common nature (SVF 2.1076; cf. Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, SVF 1.53); M. Reesor, (above, note 19) 18–19, has a useful discussion.

submitting to the *lex* established by Nature (note the play on *errabat* 4.197). But in the perverted world of civil war, the normal definition of a πάθος is inverted (*iusque datum sceleri* 1.2); for a Caesarian, it is a πάθος to act in accord with nature.

For his part Petreius, disturbed by the events, moves to restore discipline (i.e., Caesar's type of *lex*). The Pompeian acts alike, seeking Caesar to inflame his troops with *ira* and thus overwhelm their natural impulses, and to undo the *foedera pacis* which their natural *amor* had produced (4.205–11). His speech (4.212–35) appeals again and again to their duty (*fides*). But this duty is a perversion. As the poet pointedly declares, the duty toward which Petreius enkindles his men is an abomination of nature (*fecit monstra fides* 4.245), not the true duties which their natural orientation caused them to recall (*renovata fides*, 4.204). His speech is effective in perverting their *amor*.

...et omnes
concussit mentes scelerumque reduxit amorem. (4.235–36)

Their *furor* and *rabies* return, bringing with them a perverse *amor scelerum* in place of their *sacer amor*. The simile which follows is pointed and pathetic, it too recalls the earlier Caesar-Laelius episode (1.325–33).

sic, ubi desuetae silvis in carcere clauso
mansuevere ferae et voltus posuere minaces
atque hominem didicere pati, si torrida parvos
venit in ora cruor, redeunt rabiesque furorque,
admonitaeque tument gustato sanguine fauces;
fervet et a trepido vix abstinere ira magistro. (4.237–42)

The troops have for a brief moment risen out of the bestial state into which πάθη had plunged them, and become like men again. But *ira* returns them to their perverted state.¹⁹ Petreius has transformed them into an enemy which Caesar rejoices to have—a guilty one. Indeed, like Caesar's Laelius, Petreius' men now rejoice to kill their own kinsmen (4.249ff.). This image of Caesar (and Petreius) as perverter of men's natural orientation is in stark contrast to the depiction of Cato in book two. Indeed, when one compares Lucan's introduction of Caesar with his introduction of the Stoic wise man, Caesar appears even more clearly as the Stoic fool.

The Brutus-Cato-Marcia exchanges all serve to show Cato's desire to strengthen and heal the bonds which hold society together. Central to his speech to Brutus is the wish that somehow he alone could receive all the *nefas* of civil war and leave his fellow man intact (2.311–13). Thus it is not by accident that Cato compares his concern over the state to that of a father grieving for a dead son (2.299–303)—that same son whom Caesar would have Laelius kill. The image has οἰκείωσις as its starting point: parental love is the basis for patriotism. As love extends from family to state, so too do the other aspects of love, especially grief (*dolor*) at the loss of a loved one. Lucan returns to the image in his own voice when he later notes:

¹⁹ Cf. of course the simile which Caesar applies to Pompey at 1.327–33.

uni quippe vacat studiis odiisque carenti
humanum lugere genus. (2.377–78)

The image is characteristic of a Stoic wise man, and so appropriate for Cato.

Moreover, there is another very striking contrast. While Laelius is part of Caesar's body, Cato is part of the cosmos' body (2.289–97). Indeed, his argument for his participation in the war rests on the proposition that he as a part of Rome must participate in her conflagration (the civil war) just as all men as part of the cosmos must participate in the universal conflagration.²⁰ Moreover, Cato reasons, how can he, a Roman with ties to his fellow Romans, refuse to enter the war when all mankind (people with more remote ties to Rome) is rushing to war (2.292–94)? Οἰκείωσις forces him to fight. Thus, while Caesar causes civil war by making other men an extension of himself, Cato, because he is an extension of that which Caesar wishes to make over into his own image, must fight.

Lucan reinforces this with the Cato-Marcia exchange (2.326–49). The episode focuses attention on Cato as defender of the family—again the Stoic basis for one's relationship to the state. The contrast with Laelius is striking. For whereas Laelius rejects all duties from family to country, Cato accepts all his duties, beginning with the family. Indeed, Lucan notes that Cato has done his duty to Rome by the procreation of three children, and to Stoic doctrine by sharing his wife's fruitful womb with another wise man (2.329–33).²¹ Lucan brings Cato the binder into sharper contrast with Caesar the destroyer by means of the marriage itself. For at the outset he notes:

...et, tempora quamquam
sint aliena toris iam fato in bella vocante,
foedera sola tamen vanaque carentia pompa
iura placent sacrisque deos admittere testes. (2.350–53)

The contrast is indeed fitting. At the very moment (*iam*) at which Caesar is dissolving the bonds which unite humanity and Romans, Cato is binding the bond which gives rise to the state. The poet reinforces this suggestion with political terms (*foedera* and *iura*).

At the end of the wedding scene, Lucan returns to the larger aspects of οἰκείωσις. He describes Cato's beliefs in lines reminiscent of the development which Cicero's Cato gave to the doctrine (cf. *Fin.* 3.20.67):

...hi mores, haec duri inmota Catonis
secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere
naturamque sequi patriaeque inpendere vitam
nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo. (2.380–383)

Here the poet carefully delineates the character of his Stoic wise man so as to invite comparison with Caesar. Cato follows his moral standards without exception; Caesar is driven now here, now there by his lusts (1.146). Cato is

²⁰ See Lapidge (above, note 1).

²¹ For the wise man taking a wife, see *SVF* 1.270, 3.616, 686, 727–31; for sharing her womb with another wise man, see *SVF* 1.269, 3.728, 729.

durus because he is unyielding in his commitment to the right and to his fellow men; Caesar is *durus* because he ignores the interests of his fellow men (5.682–84). Cato is the epitome of moderation and temperance; Caesar is the epitome of avarice and immediate gratification (10.53–67). Cato offers his life for his country; Caesar offers his countrymen's lives for his own greatness (5.319–64, 7.250–329). Cato believes that he was born to serve all mankind, not himself; Caesar believes that the whole world is born to serve him (*inter alios* Curio's appeal to him, 1.285). It is in this last point that Lucan's Caesar is most clearly a Stoic fool: he treats others as an extension of his own being rather than recognizing that his being is part of mankind. It is this, moreover, which makes Caesar a villain for Lucan. In accordance with natural orientation, Cato the wise man seeks to serve society by binding it closer together; Caesar, the Stoic fool, seeks to make it serve him by destroying the very bonds which hold it together.²²

²² I would very much like to thank Professors Mark Morford, David Hahn, Charles Babcock, and Elaine Fantham, as well as the anonymous referees and the editor of *TAPA* for their comments and suggestions.